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THE SURVEY OF PENSION-RELATED
CASE LAW
Second Circuit holds that New York State tax on gross receipts
from patient care services is preempted when State taxes benefits
provided by ERISA-qualified health care plan
In NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Services Fund v. Axelrod,1
trustees of a fund established to administer an employee welfare
benefit plan that provided health care services to participants of a
plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA")2 sought declaratory and injunctive relief from a
Health Facility Assessment ("HFA7), 3 which taxed gross receipts
from patient care services and general operations of all hospitals
in New York State.4 The trustees argued that the HFA imposed a
levy on contributions and payments for health care benefits pro-
vided by the fund and, as such, was preempted by ERISA.5 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that ERISA did not preempt the HFA because the as-
sessment is a tax of general application with a minimal, incidental
impact on the plan.6
In reversing the judgment of the district court, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that a "law
'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the
phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan."7
Although a state law with a remote or tenuous effect on a plan is
not preempted, as in the case of many laws of general applicabil-
ity," the court distinguished such generally applicable laws from
the HFA. The court noted:
1 27 F.3d 823 (2d Cir. 1994).
2 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
3 N.Y. PuB. HE.TH LAw § 2807-d (McKinney 1993).
4 NYSA-ILA, 27 F.3d at 825.
5 Id. at 825-26. ERISA "supersedes] any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
6 NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund v. Axelrod, No. 92-2279 (JSM), slip op.
at 8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1992).
7 NYSA.ILA, 27 F.3d at 826 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,
96-97 (1983)).
8 Id. at 826-27 (citing District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 113 S.
Ct. 580, 583 n.1 (1992)).
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The HFA does not apply broadly to every sector of society in New
York; nor does it apply to the Fund simply because it engaged in
certain kinds of activities which any other member of society
might engage in, such as purchasing gasoline or paying one's em-
ployees. Rather, the HFA targets only the health care industry.
Because this industry is, by definition, the realm where ERISA
welfare plans must operate, the HFA was bound to affect them
The tax depletes those assets earmarked for the provision of
health care benefits and, as a result, will cause the Fund to re-
duce benefits provided and/or to charge beneficiaries more in the
future for benefits received.9
Moreover, the court rejected the district court's holding that
the impact of the HFA was "too insubstantial to trigger preemp-
tion."10 Although the "magnitude of a statute's economic impact
on employee benefit plans may enter the analysis where the stat-
ute's connection to the ERISA plan is otherwise insufficient for
preemption ... [a] statute that 'relates to' ERISA plans cannot
escape preemption simply because the magnitude of the impact is
thought to be insubstantial.""
The court also rejected the argument that the fund could
restructure its finances so that activities of the fund unrelated to
health care services could be taxed while leaving untaxed the
services protected by ERISA, thus avoiding the preemption issue.
"Requirements under state law that force plans to change their
traditional methods of administration or to adopt different meth-
ods on a state-by-state basis are features of state regulation that
ERISA was designed to prevent."' 2
9 Id. at 827.
10 Id. at 828. The HFA imposed a tax rate on the plan of 0.6%. Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
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Appellate Division, Third Department, holds that ERISA preempts
New York common-law contract claims unless claims were based
on conduct that occurred prior to ERISA's effective date
In Greco v. International Hodcarriers, Building & Common
Laborers' Union Local 17 Pension Fund,1 a pension plan partici-
pant ("Greco") brought an action against the pension plan alleging
breach of contract, violation of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 2 breach of fiduciary duty, negli-
gence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The union,
of which Greco was a member, established the pension fund in
1965 and made payments into the fund on Greco's behalf under a
collective bargaining agreement.3 The plan provided for vesting of
benefits after reaching a minimum number of "service credits." If
the participant's service fell below a stated minimum for two con-
secutive years, however, all previous service credits would be lost.
In 1973, the plan was amended to characterize "service credits" as
either "base credits" for a full year of service or as "bonus credits"
for service of 200 hours above the minimum hours required for the
base credits.4 The plan also provided for a "deferred vested pen-
sion" which would allow participants to receive benefits regardless
of service breaks. In 1975, however, the plan was amended such
that it would not consider bonus credits in determining vesting
under the deferred vested pension.
Greco experienced a break in service from 1974 to 1979, and
when he applied for pension benefits upon his retirement in 1992,
the fund manager informed Greco that he did not qualify for the
deferred vested pension which would have provided him greater
benefits than he was otherwise eligible to receive. The Supreme
Court Greene County, held that state law governed the critical
acts or omissions that gave rise to Greco's claims because the acts
or omissions occurred prior to the enactment of ERISA and, there-
fore, were not preempted by ERISA.5
The Appellate Division, Third Department, held that "if it
was not inevitable that plaintiff would be denied benefits-that is,
if the decision to deny benefits was discretionary or the plan was
1 201 A.D.2d 65, 613 N.Y.S.2d 996 (3d Dep't 1994).
2 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
3 Greco, 201 A.D.2d at 66-67, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
4 Id. at 67, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
5 Id. at 68, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
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ambiguous and subject to interpretation-then the relevant act is
the denial of benefits itself."6 The determination of Greco's bene-
fits depended on whether the bonus credits Greco earned prior to
his break in service in 1974 were included in the calculation. If
they were included Greco would have qualified for the deferred
vested pension prior to his service break in 1974. The court held:
It cannot be said ... that the denial of Greco's deferred. vested
pension benefits inexorably followed from the provisions of the
plan, or that the trustees' conclusion that Greco had not attained
vested status was completely dictated by Greco's actions and the
plan provisions in effect prior to 1975. The acts triggering
Greco's claims of breach of contract were the adoption of the
amendment in December 1975 which provided that bonus credits
were not to be considered for vesting purposes, retroactive appli-
cation of that amendment to Greco and the trustees' interpreta-
tion of the 1974 plan documents, all of which occurred after Jan-
uary 1, 1975 .... That being the case, plaintiff's common-law
claims for breach of contract.., must be dismissed as preempted
by ERISA_7
The court also stated that in determining whether retroactive
application of the eligibility rules was "arbitrary and capricious,"
the standard of review proposed by the defendant plan, the court
must examine "whether the participant was informed of the
change and afforded a sufficient opportunity to act to preserve his
or her benefits."8 Finding no such evidence, the court held that
the trustees' actions were "unjust and, therefore, arbitrary and
capricious."9
ERISA preempts application of New York Human Rights Law to
employee benefit plan's coverage of pregnancy-related disability
benefits, but does not preempt application of New York Disability
Law to employee benefit plan maintained solely to comply with
State disability laws
In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,1 Delta Air Lines, Inc. and
other airlines (the "Airlines"), Burroughs Corp., and Metropolitan
6 Id. at 68-69, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 998 (citations omitted).
7 Id. at 69-70, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 998-99 (citations omitted). The negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty claims were not preempted, however, because they concerned
activity occurring from 1965 to 1974, prior to ERISA's effective date. Id.
8 Id. at 71, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
9 Id., 613 N.Y.S.2d at 999-1000.
1 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
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Life Insurance Co., appellees therein, provided their employees
with medical and disability benefits through various welfare plans
subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA7).2 Contrary to the requirements of the New York
Human Rights Law3 and the New York Disability Benefits Law,4
these welfare plans did not include benefits for employees who be-
came pregnant because the plans were created prior to the effec-
tive date of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.1 Appellees
sought declaratory judgment, alleging that the Human Rights
Law was preempted by ERISA, and the Airlines also alleged that
the Disability Benefits Law was similarly preempted.
In 1976, the New York Court of Appeals held that the Human
Rights Law prohibits discrimination in employee benefit plans on
the basis of pregnancy.' The New York State Legislature
amended the New York Disability Benefits Law in 1981 to require
that employers treat pregnancy like any other disability.v Section
514(a) of ERISA provides, however, that it shall supersede "any
and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA.8
The United States Supreme Court held in Shaw that the
"plain language of Section 514(a), the structure of [ERISA], and
its legislative history... [indicate] that the Human Rights Law
and the Disability Benefits Law relate to any employee benefit
plan within the meaning of 514(a)."9 Further, the Court held that
the Human Rights Law was preempted with respect to employee
benefit plans insofar as the plans prohibit practices that are per-
missible under federal law.'0
Since Section 514(d) of ERISA "provides that 514(a) shall not
'be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or super-
2 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
3 N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296.1(a) (McKinney 1993) (prohibiting employment discrimi-
nation based on sex).
4 N.Y. WoRy- CorNP. LAw §§ 200-242 (McKinney 1994).
5 See Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (1988)). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act made discrimination based on
pregnancy unlawful under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id.
6 Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 84,
85-86, 359 N.E.2d 393, 395, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886-87 (1976).
7 See Ch. 352, § 2, [1981] N.Y. LAws 613 (McKinney).
8 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
9 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100.
10 Id. at 103-04.
19941
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sede any law of the United States,'" to the extent that the Human
Rights Law provided a means of enforcing title VII, the Court rea-
soned that preemption would impair and modify federal law."
Thus, preemption would frustrate the goal of encouraging state
and federal enforcement of title VII. 12 When state laws prohibit
employment practices that are lawful under title VII, however,
preemption would not impair Title VII within the meaning of Sec-
tion 514(d), and such state laws would be preempted by ERISA.'8
The Court held that the Disability Benefits Law did not fall
within the ERISA exemption as provided in section 4(b)(3) of ER-
ISA.' 4 This subsection exempts "any employee benefit plan...
maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable...
disability insurance laws."15 The Court distinguished between
"plans" and "portions of plans," finding that only separately ad-
ministered disability plans maintained solely to comply with the
Disability Benefits Law were exempt.' 6 The portions of the Air-
lines' multibenefit plans maintained solely to comply with the Dis-
ability Benefits Law, therefore, were not exempt.' 7 The Court ad-
ded that although a state may require an employer to maintain a
separate disability plan, the fact that state law permits employers
to meet their state law obligations by including disability benefits
in a multibenefit ERISA plan does not make the state law unen-
forceable against employers utilizing that option.'8 It is, there-
fore, not preempted by ERISA to the extent that the portion of the
multibenefit plan is maintained to comply with the state disability
laws.19
State common law that "relates to" an employee benefit plan is pre-
empted by ERISA even though the State law was not specifically
intended to affect the plan
In Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co.,' the Equitable Life As-
surance Society of the United States issued a group life insurance
11 Id. at 100-01.
12 Id. at 102.
13 Id. at 103-06.
14 Id. at 106.
15 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (1988).
16 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 106-08.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 108.
19 Id.
1 7 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 68:577
SURVEY OF PENSION-RELATED CASE LAW
policy to the Colgate Palmolive Co. ("Colgate"), which insured the
life of Brij L. Kapur ("Brij"), an employee of Colgate. The policy
provided that "t]he beneficiary of the employee's insurance for
loss of life [would] be the person(s) named by the employee as
shown on the records kept on [the] policy."2
Between 1983 and 1985, Brij executed a number of benefici-
ary designations on the policy making his cousin Krishna either
sole beneficiary or joint beneficiary with Krishna's wife. Krishna
was also a beneficiary in Brij's 1982 will. In March 1989, Brij exe-
cuted a codicil to his 1982 will, leaving his estate to his brother
Krishen L. Kapur. Six months later, Brij revoked a prior power of
attorney given to Krishna and requested return of the power of
attorney along with the 1982 will. Krishna complied with these
requests. Brij executed a new will on December 21, 1989, revok-
ing all prior wills and codicils, making ten specific pecuniary be-
quests to various relatives, and leaving the residue of his estate to
his sister-in-law Rochelle Kapur ("Rochelle"). The 1989 will, how-
ever, never specifically mentioned the proceeds of the insurance
policy.
Upon Brij's death, Krishna demanded payment from Colgate
of the proceeds due under the policy. Shortly thereafter, Rochelle
contacted Colgate to declare her interest in the proceeds. Subse-
quently, Krishna brought an action in the Supreme Court of New
York, New York County, seeking recovery on the policy. Colgate
and Equicor removed the case to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York on the basis that Krishna's
claim arose under an employee welfare benefit plan which was
subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"'. 4 The court granted Colgate's application for inter-
pleader, which made Rochelle a party individually and in her ca-
pacity as administratrix of Brij's will. Brij's brothers Nand L.
Kapur and Krishen L. Kapur were also impleaded. The district
court denied Krishna's motion for summary judgment and
granted, sua sponte, summary judgment for Rochelle as adminis-
tratrix. The district court concluded that the execution of the codi-
cil superseding the 1982 will, and the revocation of the power of
2 Id. at 12.
3 The complaint misnamed the proper Equitable entity as defendant; Equicor,
Inc. undertook the obligation to make payments under the policy and was the appro-
priate Equitable entity in the litigation. Id. at 11 n.1.
4 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
1994]
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attorney previously granted to Krishna "left no doubt that [Brij]
intend[ed] no further personal or financial contact with
[Krishna]." 5
Section 514(a) of ERISA provides that the statute "shall su-
persede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereaf-
ter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by the statute.6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted
that, although in appropriate circumstances courts may develop a
federal common law under ERISA, they may base the federal com-
mon law on state common law only if it is consistent with the poli-
cies underlying the federal statute.7 The district court applied
New York law in granting summary judgment for Rochelle be-
cause "ERISA is silent on the matter of which party shall be
deemed beneficiary among disputing claimants."8 Persuaded by
other circuit courts, the Second Circuit rejected the district court's
conclusion, and held that ERISA preempts state law whenever
state laws "relate to" a benefit plan. This preemption would apply
even if the laws were not specifically designed to affect such
plans.9 Furthermore, the court emphasized public policy in favor
of "uniform, uncomplicated administration of ERISA plans, many
of which function in a number of states," and concluded that re-
quiring administrators of such policies to investigate the various
state laws that might apply would be too great a burden.10
State law that requires employers to provide supplemental benefits
to employees working on public works contracts "relates to" an em-
ployee benefit plan and thus is preempted by ERISA
In General Electric Co. v. New York State Department of La-
bor, 1 the New York Service Center, a "sub-entity" of General Elec-
tric Co. ("GE"), was a party to a collective bargaining agreement
with the local chapter of the International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers. The agreement provided for a number of nationally
administered ERISA plans covering pensions, disability, medical
5 Krishna, 7 F.3d at 13.
6 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
7 Krishna, 7 F.3d at 14 (citing Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 959-60 (11th
Cir. 1986)).
8 Id.
9 Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Hanslip, 939 F.2d 904, 906-07
(10th Cir. 1991)).
10 Id. at 16.
1 891 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912 (1990).
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assistance, and job and income security. In General Electric, the
Long Island Railroad ("LIRR") employed a group of GE employees
pursuant to a public works contract. Section 220(3) of the New
York Labor Law2 requires that wage rates on public works con-
tracts not be less than the prevailing wage rate paid in the locality
to the majority of workers in the same trade or occupation. Sec-
tion 220(3) also requires that supplements be provided to such
workers in accordance with prevailing local practices.'
The Commissioner of Labor determined that the supplements
provided by GE were different from, and in some cases less than,
those due under section 220, and therefore notified the LIRR to
withhold $241,117 in payments owed GE. The payments repre-
sented the cost of effecting compliance plus interest and penalties.
GE moved for a preliminary injunction in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing that
New York's attempt to regulate GE's payment of supplemental
benefits was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act 4 and
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA7). 5
The court denied GE's motion.6
Section 514(a) of ERISA states that the statute supersedes all
state laws insofar as they "relate to" an employee benefit plan cov-
ered by ERISA.7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit held that the portion of New York Labor Law section
220 addressing supplemental benefits provided by employers is
preempted by ERISA.' The court reasoned that the intent behind
ERISA was to "preempt all state laws that relate to employee ben-
efit plans and not just state laws which purport to regulate an
area expressly covered by ERISA."9 The court explained that "[a]
2 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 220(3) (McKinney 1986).
3 Id. § 220(3). "Supplements" are defined as "all remuneration for employment
paid in any medium other than cash, or reimbursement for expenses, or any pay-
ments which are not 'wages'.. . including, but not limited to, health, welfare, non-
occupational disability, retirement, vacation benefits, holiday pay and life insurance."
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 220(5)(b) (McKinney 1986).
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988 & Supp. V).
5 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
6 General Elec. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 698 F. Supp. 1093, 1102
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), vacated, 891 F.2d 25 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912 (1990).
7 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
8 General Elec. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 891 F.2d 25, 30 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912 (1990).
9 Id. at 29 (quoting Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 77 (1st Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978)).
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state law 'relates to' employee benefit plans when it has 'connec-
tion with or reference to' such plans"10 and that "[s]uch connection
exists where a state statute prescribes either the type and amount
of an employer's contributions to a plan'... the rules and regula-
tions under which the plan operates,.., or the nature and amount
of the benefits provided thereunder."1' Thus, because the New
York Labor Law intrudes upon all three of these areas, those pro-
visions are preempted by ERISA.12
Employers can contract to provide nonterminable postemployment
welfare benefits irrespective of ERISA's vesting protection
provisions
In In re Consolidated Mutual Insurance Co.,' Consolidated
Mutual Insurance Co. ("CMIC") provided its employees with con-
tinuation of group term life, medical, and health insurance cover-
age upon retirement. In 1979, while acting as liquidator of CMIC,
the New York State Superintendent of Insurance terminated the
contractual benefits of the retired employees when it terminated
all of CMIC's "subsisting contracts and other obligations."' Retir-
ees sought to restore their benefits on the ground that the benefits
were protected against termination by the liquidator.
After a hearing, a supreme court referee reported that the liq-
uidator had the authority to withdraw the benefits, noting that
CMIC's Employee Guidebook reserved the right to terminate the
benefits. The Supreme Court, Kings County, affirmed the Refe-
ree's findings.3 The Appellate Division, Second Department, af-
firmed the Supreme Court's ruling, applying "principles of con-
tract law" to find that the Employee Guidebook "adequately
reserved" CMIC's (and the liquidator's) right to terminate the
benefits.4
Both parties agreed that the benefit plans CMIC gave to its
employees were "welfare benefit" plans within the meaning of sec-
tion 3(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
10 Id. (quoting Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 327 (2d Cir. 1985),
aff'd, 477 U.S. 901 (1986)).
11 Id. (citations omitted).
12 Id. at 29-30.
1 77 N.Y.2d 144, 566 N.E.2d 633, 565 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1990).
2 Id. at 146-47, 566 N.E.2d at 633, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
3 Id. at 147, 566 N.E.2d at 634, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
4 Id. (quoting In re Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 154 A.D.2d 592, 593, 546 N.Y.S.2d
420, 421 (2d Dep't 1989)).
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("ERISA7).5 The parties also agreed that employees were not pro-
tected by the automatic vesting6 or minimum funding require-
ments7 of ERISA. 8 Writing for the court of appeals, Judge Bel-
lacosa stated that "[e]mployers can contract to provide
nonterminable postemployment welfare benefits to retirees irre-
spective of ERISA's vesting protection," and that employees bear
the burden of proving an employer's intent to provide such
nonterminable postemployment benefits.' Judge Bellacosa also
stated that the unfunded status of a plan is not dispositive of the
issue.10 The court held that the Employee Guidebook was ambig-
uous regarding terminability of benefits; therefore, the use of ex-
trinsic evidence to prove CMIC's intent regarding the
nonterminability of the benefits was appropriate."- The retirees
submitted letters and memoranda they had received from CMIC
which indicated that life and health insurance would be available
to them for the remainder of their lives and that the retirees were
"100% vested."12 Thus, the retirees met their burden of proof.
Judge Simons dissented, arguing that ERISA requires that
every employee benefit plan be established and maintained pursu-
ant to a written instrument.13 Additionally, each employee re-
ceived a summary plan description ("SPD") 4-in this case, the
Employee Guidebook. Judge Simons believed it was inappropriate
for the court to consider instruments other than the written bene-
5 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
6 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (1988).
7 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(1) (1988).
8 In re Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 77 N.Y.2d at 147, 566 N.E.2d at 634, 565
N.Y.S.2d at 435.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 150, 566 N.E.2d at 635, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
12 Id., 566 N.E.2d at 635-36, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 436-37.
13 See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988).
14 See id. § 1022(a).
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fit plan and the Employee Guidebook in deciding whether an em-
ployer has reserved his right to terminate the plan.15
Remedy provided by New York Business Corporation Law does not
directly or indirectly regulate employee welfare plan and is not pre-
empted by ERISA
In Sasso v. Vachris,1 plaintiffs were trustees of a welfare and
pension trust fund established by a union local. A collective bar-
gaining agreement entered into between the union local and Va-
car Construction Co. ("Vacar") required Vacar to make contribu-
tions to the fund. The fund was created to provide welfare and
retirement benefits to the union members and other covered em-
ployees who performed services between May 1978 and February
1979. The trustees brought an action against the ten largest
shareholders of Vacar under New York Business Corporation Law
section 6302 when Vacar filed a petition for arrangement under
chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Code.3 Defendants moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs' action was preempted by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA7). 4
Section 514(a) of ERISA provides that the statute shall super-
sede "any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA.5 The court
of appeals held that section 630 of the Business Corporation Law
does not impermissibly regulate the terms and conditions of em-
ployee benefit plans and therefore is not preempted by ERISA.6
Because section 630 is "remedial in nature," it "does not 'regulate,
directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of plaintiffs' wel-
fare and pension plan and, therefore, does not 'relate to' the em-
ployee benefit plan within the meaning of section 514(a) of ER-
15 In re Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 77 N.Y.2d at 151, 566 N.E.2d at 636, 565
N.Y.S.2d at 437-38.
1 66 N.Y.2d 28, 484 N.E.2d 1359, 494 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1985).
2 N.Y. Bus. CoRe. LAw § 630(a) (McKinney 1986) states that "[tihe ten largest
shareholders... of every [closely held] corporation... shall jointly and severally be
personally liable for all debts, wages or salaries due and owing to any of its laborers,
servants or employees other than contractors, for services performed by them for such
corporation." Id.
3 11 U.S.C. § 1101-1174 (1988 & Supp. V).
4 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
5 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988 & Supp. IV).
6 Sasso v. Vachris, 66 N.Y.2d 28, 29-30,484 N.E.2d 1359, 1359, 494 N.Y.S.2d 856,
856 (1985).
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ISA."7 The court further noted that 'i]f the statute has any
palpable effect on the plan, it is the type of tenuous, remote or
peripheral effect that ERISA was not meant to preempt."' The
court supported its holding by referring to the legislative history
of the 1980 amendments to ERISA, which indicated that ERISA's
civil remedies were intended to supplement, rather than super-
sede, existing state remedies.9
Repudiation of pension rights by pension plan triggers running of
State six-year statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty
and collaterally estops action in federal courts under ERISA
In Lamontagne v. Board of Trustees of the United Wire, Metal
& Machine Pension Fund,' the plaintiff was a former participant
in the defendant's pension plan. The plan required an employee to
work at least eight hundred hours within two consecutive calen-
dar years. Any failure to meet this requirement would result in
cancellation of all previously accrued pension credits. At the abso-
lute discretion of the pension fund, a grace period of up to eight
quarters would be granted for breaks in employment based on dis-
ability. The plaintiff left employment because of disability in 1971
and never returned. The plaintiff's request for his pension bene-
fits in 1978 was denied because the plaintiff experienced a five
year break in employment. In 1986, he resubmitted his request
and applied for a different class of pension. The plaintiff was in-
formed that due to a break in service which occurred five years
before his 1978 application, he was no longer a participant in the
pension fund.
The plaintiff commenced an action in federal court in 1986
claiming violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA). 2 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that, even granting plaintiff the grace pe-
riod for his disability, the plaintiff's pension credits were can-
celled in 1976, and the pension fund clearly repudiated his claim
7 Id. at 33, 484 N.E.2d at 1362, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 859 (citations omitted).
8 Id. at 34, 484 N.E.2d at 1362, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
9 Id. at 35-36, 484 N.E.2d at 1363-64, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 860-61.
1 183 A.D.2d 424, 583 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 80 N.Y.2d 759, 605
N.E.2d 873, 591 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1992).
2 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
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in 1978.1 The plaintiff thereafter commenced an action in state
court, alleging a violation of defendant's common law fiduciary du-
ties. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, stated
that a decision in federal court does not have res judicata effect on
a state action "where it was clear that the pretrial dismissal of
Federal causes of action did not include adjudication of a pendent
State claim on its merits."4 In New York, dismissal of a pendent
state claim by a federal court is presumed not to be on the merits
unless there is a clear contrary indication, which was absent in
this case.5 Nonetheless, the court held that the plaintiff had a
"full and fair opportunity to litigate in the federal court whether
or not there occurred in 1978 a clear repudiation of his pension
rights that would commence the run of the conceded six-year Stat-
ute of Limitations for breach of fiduciary duty."' The plaintiff's
state action was, therefore, time-barred and properly dismissed
under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.7
ERISA does not preempt New York Labor Law with regard to va-
cation benefits when paid through payroll from general assets of
employer and not through plan
In Tap Electrical Contracting Service, Inc. v. Hartnett,1 Tap
Electrical Contracting Service, Inc. ("Tap") entered into a contract
with the New York State Department of Transportation, funded
by both the state and federal governments, to replace lighting on
the Northern State Parkway. An investigation by the New York
State Department of Labor led to charges against Tap for not pay-
ing its employees prevailing wages and supplements, and employ-
ing an excessive number of apprentices. The New York State
Commissioner of Labor barred Tap, under then New York Labor
Law section 220-b(3)(b), 2 from bidding on or being awarded any
3 Lamontagne v. Pension Plan of the United Wire, Metal & Mach. Pension Fund,
869 F.2d 153, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818 (1989).
4 Lamontagne v. Board of Trustees of the United Wire, Metal and Mach. Pension
Fund, 183 A.D.2d 424, 425, 583 N.Y.S.2d 838, 840 (1st Dep't 1992).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 426, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
7 Id. at 427, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
1 156 A.D.2d 612, 549 N.Y.S.2d 118 (2d Dep't 1989).
2 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 220-b(3)(b) (1986 & Supp. 1994) provides that "[w]hen two final
determinations have been rendered against a [person] ... within any consecutive six-
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public works contracts for five years, directed it to pay its employ-
ees for the underpayment of wages and supplements plus interest,
and imposed a civil penalty. Tap argued that the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA) 3 preempted the
New York State Labor Law.
Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts "any and all State laws in-
sofar as they.., relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by
the statute.4 An "employee welfare benefit plan" is defined as
[a]ny plan, fund, or program which was.., established or main-
tained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by
both, to the extent that [it] was established or is maintained for
the purpose of providing ... (A) medical, surgical, or hospital
care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, dis-
ability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprentice-
ship or other training programs.
5
The Appellate Division, Second Department, cited Massachu-
setts v. Morash,6 a United States Supreme Court case that held
"[i]t is unlikely that Congress intended to subject to ERISA's re-
porting and disclosure requirements those vacation benefits which
by their nature are payable on a regular basis from the general
assets of the employer and are accumulated over time only at the
election of the employee."7
The court held that Tap "did not provide its employees with
vacation and holiday supplements through a plan but rather, paid
them through its payroll"; hence, ERISA did not "preclude the ap-
plication of the New York State Labor Law to regulate the rate of
such payments."8 The court did conclude, however, that the wel-
fare, pension, annuity, and joint educational funds were covered
by ERISA, and remitted the matter back to the Department of La-
year period [after October 1, 1966] determining that such [person]... has willfully
failed to pay the prevailing rate of wages or to provide supplements in accordance
with this article... such [person] shall be ineligible to submit a bid on or be awarded
any public work contract or subcontract within the state .... "
3 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
4 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
5 Id. § 1002(1).
6 490 U.S. 107 (1989).
7 Tap, 156 A.D.2d at 614, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 120 (citing Morash, 490 U.S. at 116).
8 Id-
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bor to determine the exact amounts of non-ERISA supplemental
underpayments. 9
Remedy provided under New York Business Corporation Law for
wasting corporate assets by excessive payments to employee pen-
sion plan is not preempted by ERISA
In Cornell Manufacturing Co. v. Mushlin, defendants Sidney
and Muriel Mushlin were the sole owners' from 1941 to 1969 of
the assets and business of plaintiff Cornell Manufacturing Com-
pany ("Cornell"). In 1959, they established an employee pension
plan funded by the company. After the sale of Cornell to National
Screw & Manufacturing Company in 1969, Sidney Mushlin re-
mained as president and general manager of Cornell and as
trustee of the employee pension plan. In 1974, Muriel Mushlin,
also employed by Cornell, joined Sidney Mushlin as cotrustee of
the plan. Both were also members of the pension committee. Ap-
proximately two years later, the Mushlins' employment was ter-
minated, and they were removed from their positions as trustees.
Cornell brought a state action against the Mushlins under section
720 of the New York Business Corporation Law2 alleging that the
Mushlins had "wasted corporate assets by, among other things,
causing excessive payments to be made into the pension plan over
which they had exclusive control."3 The Mushlins moved to dis-
miss the complaint "insofar as it relate[d] to the ("pension plan")
and... management of and/or receipt of benefits under the Pen-
sion Plan,"4 on the ground that the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA7) 5 preempts any such state action.6
The Appellate Division, Second Department, considered four
factors in determining whether a state action is preempted:
(1) the extent to which the law in question relates to an area tra-
ditionally within the State's domain; (2) the extent to which the
purpose or effect of the law impinges upon employee benefit
plans; (3) the extent to which the relief sought or procedures em-
9 Id. at 614-15, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 120-21.
1 70 A.D.2d 123, 420 N.Y.S.2d 231 (2d Dep't 1979).
2 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 720 (McKinney 1986).
3 Cornell, 70 A-D.2d at 125, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
4 Id. at 127, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
5 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
6 ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or here-
after relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C § 1144(a) (1988).
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ployed are incompatible with those of ERISA; and (4) the extent
to which the rights sought to be enforced by the aggrieved party
actually arise under an employee benefit plan.7
The court concluded that Cornell was not seeking relief that was
incompatible with the aims of ERISA, or that impinged upon the
employee benefit plan, because section 720 of the Business Corpo-
ration Law functions to provide a remedy to corporations against
their officers and directors who wrongfully waste corporate as-
sets." Cornell's allegation that Mushlin took an improper lump-
sum pension payment, however, was beyond the state court's
power to review, because that clearly related to the management
of the employee pension plan.9 The court therefore denied the
Mushlins' motion to dismiss, except as to the lump sum pension
payment. 10
ERISA does not preempt enforcement of state laws regarding em-
ployment discrimination by state and federal agencies charged
with regulation of unlawful employment practices
In Liberty New York Mutual Insurance Co. v. State Division of
Human Rights,' the State Human Rights Appeal Board affirmed
an order of the State Division of Human Rights that found that
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. ("Liberty") had sexually discrimi-
nated against its employee, Gae Marie Close with respect to "the
terms, conditions and privileges of her employment."2 Ms. Close
had been denied pregnancy-related disability benefits in violation
of the New York Executive Law.3 Liberty argued that the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")4 pre-
empted the Division of Human Rights' authority to investigate the
claim.5
The Appellate Division, Second Department, held that, de-
spite ERISA's broad language which states that ERISA super-
7 Cornell, 70 A.D.2d at 130-31, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 236 (citations omitted).
8 Id. at 131, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
9 Id. at 131, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 236-37.
10 Id. at 132, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
1 61 A.D.2d 822, 402 N.Y.S.2d 218 (2d Dep't 1978).
2 Id. at 822, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
3 N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1994).
4 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
5 Liberty, 61 A.D.2d at 822, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
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sedes all State actions relating to employee benefit plans,6 the leg-
islative history behind that language indicates that "Congress did
not intend to narrow the jurisdiction of those Federal and State
agencies whose duty is to regulate unlawful employment prac-
tices."7 The court noted that statements made on the congres-
sional floor indicated that "antidiscrimination amendments to the
ERISA legislation were only withdrawn upon assurance from the
ERISA draftsmen that discrimination claims would continue to
fall within the jurisdiction of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission under the terms of existing law."8
Surcharges imposed under New York Public Health Law to en-
courage use of Blue Cross and Blue Shield are preempted by ER-
ISA when they affect the choices made by ERISA plans for health
care coverage
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cuomo,' Travelers Insurance
Co. ("Travelers") challenged the validity of three surcharges im-
posed under the New York Public Health Law,2 alleging that the
law was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). 3 The effect of the surcharges was to in-
crease the cost of health care to those not using Blue Cross/Blue
Shield (the "Blues") and thus created an incentive to use the
Blues, and to encourage Health Maintenance Organizations
("HMOs") to enroll Medicaid patients and thus reduced the costs
of the Medicaid program.4 The United States District Court for
6 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
7 Liberty, 61 A.D.2d at 822, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
8 Id. at 823, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
1 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. granted sub nom. New York State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 305 (1994).
2 N.Y PUB. HETH LAw § 2807-c(1)(b) (McKinney 1988) (repealed 1993) required
that insurance carriers of patients covered by health plans, other than Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, a Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO"), or government insurance
such as Medicaid, pay a 13% surcharge over the diagnosis-related group ("DRG") rate.
N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(11)(i) (McKinney 1993) imposed an additional 11%
surcharge on DRG rates for patients covered by commercial insurance. N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAw § 2807-c(2-a)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1993) created an assessment of up to
nine percent on HMOs that do not meet a quota of patients covered by Medicaid.
3 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
4 Travelers, 14 F.3d at 712.
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the Southern District of New York held that all three surcharges
were preempted by ERISA.'
On appeal, Judge McLaughlin of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit began his analysis by observing
that ERISA preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."6 A state law
"relates to" an employee benefit plan if it has a "connection with"
the plan,7 even if it has only an indirect effect.' The court added,
however, that "[s]ome state actions may affect employee benefit
plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a
finding that the law "relates to" the plan'," as do many state laws
of general application.9
The court held that the surcharges, because they were
designed to encourage use of the Blues and thereby make compet-
ing plans less appealing, "purposely interfere with the choices that
ERISA plans make for health care coverage," thus constituting a
"connection with" ERISA plans. The court concluded, therefore,
that ERISA preempts the surcharges. 10 The court noted that an
action may be preempted under section 514(a) of ERISA, yet may
be "saved" by section 514(b)(2)(A) as a "law that regulates insur-
ance."" The criteria for determining whether a law regulates in-
surance12 are: "[flirst, whether the practice has the effect of trans-
ferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the
practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the
insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited
to entities within the insurance industry."'" The court held that
application of the factors clearly indicated that the surcharges
5 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F. Supp. 996, 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
6 Travelers, 14 F.3d at 717 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (alternation in
orginial)).
7 Id. (citation omitted).
8 Id. at 718 (citing Smith v. Dunham-Bush, Inc., 959 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1992)).
9 Id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)).
10 Id. at 719.
11 Id. at 721.
12The criteria, known as the McCarran-Ferguson factors, are derived from the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988).
13 Travelers, 14 F.3d at 721 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1987)).
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were not regulating the business of insurance and therefore were
not saved from preemption. 4
Second Circuit holds that when employee benefit plan denies mem-
ber's claim the member must exhaust his or her administrative
remedies before seeking a state contract law remedy
In Kennedy v. Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield,' plaintiffs
were subscribers of several major medical plans issued by the de-
fendant Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield ("Empire"). Empire
based its physician reimbursement rates on schedules of "Custom-
ary Charges." On January 1, 1990, Empire unilaterally reformu-
lated its calculation method. Prior to this date, Empire had uti-
lized three broad geographic zones for purposes of calculating
Customary Charges. This system was changed to "zip code cluster
pricing," which divided the geographic areas into a larger number
of zones as defined by the United States Postal Service.
Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the new method of calcu-
lating reimbursements they experienced a reduction in benefits.2
On November 18, 1991, plaintiffs filed their complaint in state
court claiming that Empire, by unilaterally reformulating its
method of calculating reimbursements, had breached its contract
with plaintiffs.3 Defendant removed the case to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York based on fed-
eral question jurisdiction, "given that ERISA preempts state law
contract claims respecting denials of benefits under employee ben-
efit plans."4 Defendant thereafter moved to dismiss on the
grounds that both the contractual language and relevant law al-
lowed Empire to adopt its current method of calculating reim-
bursements, and "plaintiffs... failed to allege and pursue the ex-
haustion of their administrative remedies."5 The district court
granted Empire's motion to dismiss based on the failure of Ken-
nedy, a federal employee, to make a required appeal to the Office
of Personnel Management and the failure of the other non-govern-
mental employees to make required appeals to Empire.
14 Id. at 722-23.
1 989 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1993).
2 Id. at 591.
3 Id.
4 Id. (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987)).
5 Id.
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The issues before the court were whether, under the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA), 6 plain-
tiffs must establish an exhaustion of administrative remedies,
and, if so, whether the plaintiffs fall into the "futility exception" to
the exhaustion requirement.1 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit first recognized the well-established federal
policy that requires a plaintiff to exhaust all administrative reme-
dies before bringing a cause of action pursuant to ERISA.8
Second, the court addressed plaintiffs' argument that it would
have been futile to attempt administrative remedies. Plaintiffs
stated that several other claimants, whose claims were not gov-
erned by ERISA law, had corresponded with Empire in an unsuc-
cessful attempt to settle their grievances. The ERISA plaintiffs
used this ineffective correspondence to argue that any attempt to
assert administrative remedies would be futile on their part, and
therefore pursue the district court erred in granting summary
judgment. The court refused to accept this argument, stating that
the ERISA plaintiffs, at the very least, were required to attempt
correspondence with the defendant to rely on the "futility excep-
tion."9 Because no such attempt was made in this case, the plain-
tiffs' argument had no basis, and the court affirmed the judgment
of the district court.
New York Court of Appeals holds that ERISA preempts a state tax
to the extent the state tax has a direct economic effect on an em-
ployee benefit plan
In Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal,' the
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. ("Morgan"), which served as trustee
under the American Motors Corporation Union Retirement In-
come Plan (the "Plan"), attempted to avoid tax penalties by selling
property in 1984 that had considerably appreciated in value since
its initial purchase in 1965. In accordance with New York tax law,
Morgan paid the state $205,262 (10% of the gain). Subsequently,
Morgan filed a refund claim with the Department of Taxation and
Finance (the "Department"), reasoning that the state gains tax
6 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
7 Kennedy, 989 F.2d at 594.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 594-95.
1 80 N.Y.2d 44, 599 N.E.2d 656, 587 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1992).
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was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 ("ERISA").2 The refund claim was denied based on the
Department's argument that "ERISA preempted only those State
laws designed to regulate employee benefit plans."3
Morgan petitioned the Tax Appeals Bureau of the State Tax
Commission. The Administrative Law Judge ("AW") granted the
petition, reasoning that the transfer of property was a necessary
transfer of a Plan asset, pursuant to ERISA. Moreover, the trans-
fer resulted in a direct tax upon the Plan itself, and because the
tax related directly to the Plan, the ALI found that it must be pre-
empted. On appeal, the Tax Appeals Tribunal reversed the AIJ
ruling, holding that the gains tax was "too tenuous, remote and
peripheral to require preemption" by ERISA.4 Morgan appealed
to the Appellate Division, and the court set aside the tribunal's
determination, reasoning that the gains tax, which was imposed
directly on income derived from the sale of a Plan asset, was re-
lated to the Plan and therefore preempted by ERISA.6
Judge Kaye of the court of appeals held that a state tax of
general application, which is not directly aimed at an employee
benefit plan, is nevertheless preempted by ERISA. The court rea-
soned that Congress specifically intended to fashion a preemption
clause6 broad enough so that the regulation of pension plans
would lie exclusively in the federal domain.7 The court applied
this intent to the general state tax law and determined that, inso-
far as the law relates to and ultimately affects the Plan, it was
preempted. Because the state gains tax had a direct economic ef-
fect on the Plan itself, and this effect clearly altered future invest-
ment strategies, the state tax had more than a tenuous, remote, or
peripheral connection to the employee benefit plan.8
2 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
3 Morgan, 80 N.Y.2d at 47, 599 N.E.2d at 657, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 47, 599 N.E.2d at 658, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 253-54.
6 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
7 Morgan, 80 N.Y.2d at 48, 599 N.E.2d at 658, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
8 Id. at 51, 599 N.E.2d at 660, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
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In his dissent, Judge Titone argued that all taxes have an im-
pact on ERISA covered plans and, therefore, such criteria seem
inadequate to mandate preemption.9
New York Court of Appeals holds that ERISA does not shield em-
ployee benefit plans from state antifraud laws
In Planned Consumer Marketing v. Coats and Clark, Inc.,:
Coats and Clark, Inc. ("C&C") and Planned Consumer Marketing
('TCM") entered into two contracts in 1973 and 1974 wherein
PCM agreed to promote C&C's products. PCM brought an action
for breach of contract against C&C. C&C counterclaimed for
money already paid to PCM, alleging inadequate performance. In
1981, C&C prevailed on its counterclaim and received a judgment
for approximately $73,000. PCM claimed that it had not con-
ducted business since 1977 and could not satisfy the judgment.
Soon after, C&C discovered that Edwin Lee, PCM's president, had
deposited funds in an account in the name of Planned Consumer
Marketing Profit Sharing (the "Plan), which was valued at over
$200,000. The Plan, which was established in 1974, was qualified
as an employee benefit fund under the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA7).2
C&C commenced an action to have the funds turned over to
satisfy the judgment. C&C alleged violations of the New York
Debtor and Creditor Law,3 the New York Business Corporation
Law,4 and the New York Estate Powers and Trusts Law. PCM
and Lee moved to dismiss the action on the theory that the
Supreme Court, New York County, lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the Plan because "ERISA preempts State laws that re-
late to employee benefit plans, and, in any event, precludes the
alienation of assets in a trust regulated by that act."6
The supreme court denied PCM's motion to dismiss, stating
that the petition predominantly addressed the violation of State
fraud law and therefore did not involve ERISA. The Appellate Di-
9 Id. at 60-64, 599 N.E.2d at 665-68, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 261-64.
1 71 N.Y.2d 442, 522 N.E.2d 30, 527 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1988).
2 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
3 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAw §§ 273, 273-a, 276 (McKinney 1990).
4 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW §§ 510, 719 (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1994)).
5 N.Y. EST. PoWiERs & TRusTs LAW § 7-3.1 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994).
6 Planned Consumer Mktg., 71 N.Y.2d at 447, 522 N.E.2d at 33, 527 N.Y.S.2d at
188.
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vision, First Department, modified the trial court judgment, rul-
ing that five of the nine causes of action were not preempted by
ERISA. That court held that it was never the intent of Congress
to defeat creditors' rights and advance fraud by invoking the ER-
ISA shield against state causes of action.'
The court of appeals affirmed, stating that "the gravamen of
these actions have no relation to the provisions established by ER-
ISA," and that they do not relate either directly or indirectly to
employee benefit plans8 and thus do not fall within ERISA's
supercession clause.9
PCM also argued that ERISA's anti-alienation provision10
precludes C&C from access to the Plan's funds. The court stated
that it has never held the anti-alienation provision to be absolute
and distinguished those cases upholding the prohibition of aliena-
tion in that "the very creation and enhancement of the trust is
alleged to have been in defraud of creditors."'
State actions against trustees of employee welfare funds for breach
of fiduciary duty are preempted by ERISA
In Retail Shoe Health Commission v. Reminick,' a multiem-
ployer, jointly administered welfare fund and the trustees of the
fund brought an action against defendants, public accountants
and auditors of the fund, alleging that defendants had failed to
detect and report a misappropriation of $675,000 by Jerome Si-
mon, the fund's administrator. Reminick served a third-party
complaint against the trustees of the fund and Tolley Interna-
tional ("Tolley"), a consultant to the fund, seeking contribution or
indemnity. Tolley brought a counterclaim against Reminick and
the trustees. The trustees moved to dismiss the third-party com-
plaints and counterclaims against them, arguing that the court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the claims against the
7 Planned Consumer Mktg. v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 127 A.D.2d 355, 513 N.Y.S.2d
417 (1st Dep't 1987).
8 71 N.Y.2d at 450-52, 522 N.E.2d at 35-36, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 190-91.
9 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
10 Id. § 1056(d)(1) (1988) (indicating that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.").
11 71 N.Y.2d at 454-55, 522 N.E.2d at 37-38, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
1 62 N.Y.2d 173, 464 N.E.2d 974, 476 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1022 (1985).
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trustees were governed by the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974 ("ERISA), 2 which would preempt such claims.3
The motion to dismiss was denied by the Supreme Court, Spe-
cial Term, New York County, which held that when a "vital" state
interest is involved and is "tangential to the employee benefit
plan," ERISA does not preempt state law. The Appellate Division,
First Department, affirmed but granted the trustees leave to ap-
peal on a certified question.4
The court of appeals first categorized the trustees as fiducia-
ries within the meaning of ERISA.5 Since the nature and scope of
the trustees' duties and liability are determined by ERISA,6 the
court held that it would therefore be improper to allow the present
claims against the trustees to be reviewed in state courts.7 The
court reversed the ruling of the Appellate Division, but agreed
that those claims that arose out of transactions prior to January 1,
1975, the effective date of ERISA, could be maintained against the
trustees in a separate cause of action."
Appellate Division, First Department, holds that a benefit plan cre-
ated by doctors employed by public hospitals is a "governmental
plan" and is thus exempt from ERISA
In Donald Rubin, Inc. v. Schwartz,1 the plaintiff Donald
Rubin, Inc. ("Rubin") was retained in 1979 by the defendant
House Staff Benefits Plan (the "Plan"). A union of doctors em-
ployed by public hospitals created the Plan to provide administra-
tive and consulting services for the employee benefit plan. The
agreement stipulated that the term would be for five years, com-
mencing on July 19, 1983, and subject to automatic renewal for
successive five year periods "unless either party notifiied] the
other ... of its desire not to extend the agreement at least 180
2 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
3 Retail, 62 N.Y.2d at 177, 464 N.E.2d at 976, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 278.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 177-78, 464 N.E.2d at 976, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 278.
6 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1988).
7 Retail, 62 N.Y.2d at 178, 464 N.E.2d at 976, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 278-79.
8 Id. at 180, 464 N.E.2d at 977, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 279-80.
1 160 A.D.2d 53, 559 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1st Dep't 1990).
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days prior to the end of the initial term."2 In June 1988, defend-
ant notified Rubin that it was relieving him of all duties and re-
sponsibilities that he had under the Plan as administrator, and on
July 18, 1988, defendant terminated Rubin's employment.3
Rubin brought an action against the Plan and its trustees al-
leging tortious interference and breach of contract under the auto-
matic renewal provision of the agreement. Defendants moved to
dismiss the action, arguing that New York General Obligations
Law section 5-903 would bar enforcement of the automatic re-
newal provision, and that the contract would be unenforceable
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA7), 4 which prohibits contracts that do not "provide for ter-
mination upon 'reasonably short notice.'" 5 The lower court
granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that Rubin had failed
to give notice as required by General Obligations Law section 5-
903.
6
The Appellate Division, First Department, disposed of the de-
fendants' argument, stating that section 5-903 applies only to ser-
vice contracts for "real and personal property," and that the con-
tract here was "in the nature of a personal services contract."7
The court determined that this particular employee benefit
plan is essentially a "governmental plan," rendering it exempt
from ERISA.8 The factors to be considered in assessing whether
an employee benefit plan is governmental in nature are:
(1) whether the body is used for a government purpose and per-
forms a government function, (2) whether it performs its function
on behalf of a State or political subdivision, (3) whether private
interests are involved or government has the power or interests
of owners, (4) whether control and supervision is vested in public
authority, (5) whether statutory or other authority is necessary
2 Id. at 55, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 308. Donald Rubin, Inc. entered into similar agree-
ments with three other service plans established by the doctors' union. Id. at 55, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 308.
3 Id. at 55, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 308-09.
4 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
5 Rubin, 160 A.D.2d at 56, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 309.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 56-57, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 309-10.
8 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (1988).
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for the creation and/or use of the instrumentality and (6) the de-
gree of financial autonomy.9
In applying these factors, the court noted that "the New York City
and County hospitals which employ physician enrollees of the
plan are 'agencies' or 'instrumentalities' of a state or of a political
subdivision of a state." The court concluded, therefore, that the
Plan was a governmental plan and was exempt from the provi-
sions of ERISA.' 0
Appellate Division, Second Department, holds that a divorced wo-
man's action to exercise her former husband's right to retirement
benefits to satisfy judgment for arrears in alimony payments is not
preempted by ERISA
In Sochor v. International Business Machines Corp.,' Sochor,
the former wife of an International Business Machine ("IBM") em-
ployee, sought to exercise her husband's right to elect to receive
pension benefits so that a judgment against him could be satisfied.
Sochor and her husband were divorced in 1965 and, pursuant to
the divorce decree, Sochor was entitled to receive sixty dollars per
week in alimony payments. In 1979, plaintiff secured a money
judgment against her former husband for alimony arrears in the
amount of $15,858.48. Sochor's former husband concealed his
identity and assets in such a way that Sochor was unable to en-
force the judgment. Sochor petitioned the court for allowance to
exercise her former husband's right to receive benefits under a re-
tirement plan established by his employer, IBM.2
IBM moved to dismiss the petition on the theory that it was
not in possession of the money in which plaintiff's former husband
had "an interest or which he was entitled to possess," and that the
benefits under the plan were exempt from levy under the provi-
sions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA7). 3 The New York Supreme Court at Special Term dis-
missed Sochor's petition without prejudice. The court declared
9 Rubin, 160 A.D.2d at 59, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 311 (citing Rose v. Long Island Rail-
road Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 918 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 936 (1988)).
10 Id. at 59-60, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
1 90 A.D.2d 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d 317 (2d Dep't 1982), rev'd, 60 N.Y.2d 254, 457
N.E.2d 696, 469 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1983).
2 Id. at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
3 Id.; see Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
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that Sochor could renew her petition when her former husband
exercised his right to receive the benefits under the pension, but
until that time, "the pension rights [remain] inchoate and, thus,
are not yet ripe for sequestration."4
The Appellate Division, Second Department, in reversing the
Special Term's judgment, first determined that Sochor's former
husband had a vested interest in the retirement benefits, making
them susceptible to levy by a judgment creditor. 5 Secondly, re-
garding the plan's exemption from levy under ERISA, the court
noted that "[f]or purposes of execution after judgment... the judg-
ment creditor's (plaintiff's) right to a given item of property is
deemed coextensive with-the same as-the judgment debtor's
(defendant's) own interest in it. The theory is that the judgment
creditor steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor."6 The court
asserted that the ultimate goal of ERISA is to "insure that the
employee and his beneficiaries reap the ultimate benefits due
upon his retirement."7 "[Tihe law is settled that the provisions
contained in ERISA do not extend to traditional support obliga-
tions .... ERISA does not operate to immunize pension payments
from family support obligations."'
ERISA does not preempt state enforcement of a judgment levying
against the pension of a retiree unless the enforcement mechanism
affects the regulation of the pension fund
In National Bank of North America v. International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers Local No. 3,1 the plaintiff bank ob-
tained a money judgment against Martin Conlon, a retired pen-
sioner of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
("IBEW"). The plaintiff sought to satisfy its judgment against
Conlon by levying upon monthly payments he was receiving from
IBEW's pension fund. IBEW resisted the bank's petition, arguing
that the benefit plans are governed by the Employee Retirement
4 Sochor, 90 A.D.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
5 Id. at 444-45, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
6 Id. at 446-47, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
7 Id. at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 321 (citing American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592
F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1979)).
8 Id. at 447-48, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
1 69 A.D.2d 679, 419 N.Y.S.2d 127 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 48 N.Y.2d 752,
397 N.E.2d 1333, 422 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1979).
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Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA7) 2 and, therefore, are not
subject to state mechanisms for enforcing money judgments. The
New York Supreme Court at Special Term rejected IBEW's argu-
ment and ordered the board to pay ten percent of Conlon's pension
proceeds to the bank.'
On appeal, IBEW argued that ERISA preempts all State stat-
utes that affect pension plans,4 and that the remedies of garnish-
ment and levy are expressly prohibited by ERISA.5
In affirming the judgment of the Special Term, the court first
examined congressional intent, stating that the purpose of ERISA
is to "provide minimum standards 'assuring the equitable charac-
ter of such plans and their financial soundness,' "6 to protect bene-
ficiaries from mismanagement of such funds, and to "correct the
pattern of wasting and looting."7 The court noted that IBEW did
not claim that the state judgment enforcement mechanism in
question would in any way adversely affect the fund itself. More-
over, the court held that state laws are only preempted when they
"invade an aspect of the regulation of pension funds that is gov-
erned by ERISA as established in the Federal act."8
A self-insured disability plan that is part of a multibenefit plan
does not fall within the ERISA exemption for "separately adminis-
tered" disability plans maintained to comply with state workers'
compensation laws
In Miranda v. Division 1181 ATU - New York Welfare Fund
& Plan,' the petitioner Miranda, an employee of a transit com-
pany covered by a collective bargaining agreement with Division
1181 Amalgamated Transit Union ("Division"), was injured in an
accident involving a truck driven by a New York City employee.
The Division is a self-insured provider of disability benefits pursu-
ant to the New York Workers' Compensation Law.2 The Division
2 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
3 IBEW Local No. 3, 69 A.D.2d at 681, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 128.
4 Id. § 1144(a) (1988).
5 Id. § 1056(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
6 IBEW Local No. 3, 69 A.D.2d at 684, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 130 (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a) (1988)).
7 Id. at 684, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 684.
8 Id. at 685, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
1 196 A.D.2d 222, 609 N.Y.S.2d 354 (3d Dep't 1994).
2 N.Y. Woxm Com. LAw § 211(3), (5) (McKinney 1994).
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rejected Miranda's claim for disability benefits because she re-
fused to sign a document to give the Division a lien on the first
$50,000 of any recovery she might receive in an action against
New York City, as was provided in the Agreement and Declara-
tion of Trust and Plan of the Division 1181 A.T.U. - New York
Welfare Fund and Plan (the "Plan"). Miranda appealed to the
Workers' Compensation Board which held that the Workers' Com-
pensation Law prohibits compensation carriers from placing a lien
on the proceeds of a third party action4 and is not preempted by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").5
The Appellate Division, Third Department, noted that ERISA
"supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."6 Although the
Workers' Compensation Law is a state law that relates to an em-
ployee benefit plan, the court observed that plans which are
"maintained solely for the purpose of complying with the applica-
ble workmen's compensation laws" are exempt from ERISA cover-
age.7 Thus the issue before the court was whether the disability
benefits plan was "separately administered,"' in which case it is
exempted from ERISA governance, or whether it was part of a
larger multibenefit plan, in which case it is subject to ERISA.9
The court found that the disability benefits were only part of
the larger multibenefit plan that provides hospitalization, major
medical, dental, prescription drug, optical, and life insurance ben-
efits. The court concluded, therefore, that ERISA governed the
plan.10 The court rejected the Division's argument that because
the Division received approval to self-insure for the disability por-
tion of the Plan that portion was separately administered.1 " The
antisubrogation provision of the Workers' Compensation Law, the
court stated, is unenforceable and the Division may thus enforce
3 Miranda signed the document granting the lien but held it in escrow pending
appeal. Miranda, 196 A.D.2d at 224 n.2, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 355 n.2.
4 N.Y. WoRy. Comp'. LAw § 227 (McKinney 1994).
5 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)).
6 Miranda, 196 A.D.2d at 224, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 356 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(1988)).
7 Id. at 224. 609 N.Y.S.2d at 356, (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (1988)).
8 Miranda, 196 A.D.2d at 224, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 356 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 106-09 (1983)).
9 Miranda, 196 A.D.2d at 224, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
10 Id. at 225, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
11 Id.
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its lien against the first $50,000 of proceeds from any third party
action by Miranda.
12
12 Id. at 225, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 356-57.

